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The Relevant Product Market after Brown Shoe: A
Framework of Analysis for Clayton and Sherman
Act Cases
William MacLeod*
INTRODUCTION
Defining the relevant product market is one of the few areas in
antitrust law that has escaped extensive commentary and criticism.
Despite nearly twenty years of sometimes confusing, sometimes
conflicting practice since the Supreme Court's last general pre-
scription for treating market definition in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States,' little evaluation has issued on the value of the
standard and the performance of the lower courts in following it.
This article attempts to fill that void.
First, this article will provide the historical setting in which the
prevailing guidelines governing market definition were framed.
Next, the discussion will turn to an analysis and evaluation of
those guidelines against the standards of consistency and predict-
ability in serving the primary purpose of the antitrust laws. Fi-
nally, the elements and methodology of market definition analysis
will be examined in detail, focusing on the case law and the degree
to which courts have succeeded in following a consistent and logi-
cal pattern after Brown Shoe.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO BROWN SHOE
The first significant Supreme Court decision dealing with the is-
sue of relevant product market definition was the 1956 case of
United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane).' In
that case, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court finding that
the relevant market for duPont's cellophane product was the flex-
ible packaging material market. In so finding, the Court rejected
the government's claim that duPont had monopolized trade in the
* Associate, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1973, Ripon College; J.D.
1979, University of Miami. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Theodore
A. Groenke, Fred S. McChesney, and Timothy J. Muris on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
2. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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narrower cellophane market.
On appeal to the Court, the government claimed that the district
court had erred by broadening the relevant market to include
other wrapping materials such as glassine, waxed paper, and
grease-proof paper. The Supreme Court acknowledged that, in
comparison with other wrapping materials, cellophane possessed
unique characteristics and remained, over time, the clear prefer-
ence of some classes of customers.3 Nevertheless, it held that these
factors were not determinative of the relevant product market is-
sue before it. Rather, in rejecting any tests that would focus upon
mere physical differences between competing products, the Court
announced the reasonable interchangeability test which calls for
the inclusion in the relevant market all goods reasonably inter-
changeable.' According to the Court, this test was satisfied by evi-
dence in the record of functional interchangeability and price sen-
sitivity among flexible wrapping products. Thus, the evidence
supported the broad product market defined by the district court.5
One year later, in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. (General Motors),e the definition of the relevant product mar-
ket was again a prominent issue for the Court to address. In this
case, the government challenged, under section 7 of the Clayton
Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, duPont's acquisition
of 23% of the common stock of General Motors. Prior to the at-
tempted acquisition, duPont had been supplying paint and fabric
to General Motors.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the
Supreme Court held that there was a reasonable probability that,
if allowed to acquire the stock, duPont would be able to foreclose
its competitors from a substantial share of the relevant product
market, automotive finishes and fabrics. 7 The Court, however, did
3. Id. at 417.
4. Id. at 395. The Court laid down the following rule: "In considering what is the rele-
vant market for determining the control of price and competition, no more definite rule can
be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of which may be
illegal." Id. The Court indicated that interchangeability is "largely gauged by the purchase
of competing products for similar uses considering the price, characteristics and adaptability
of the competing commodities." Id. at 380-81.
5. Id. at 399-400.
6. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). Although the parties were the same, the facts were unrelated to
the Cellophane case.
7. The Court stated: "The record shows that automotive finishes and fabrics have suffi-
cient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from
[Vol. 12
Relevant Product Market
not in any way refer to the general reasonable interchangeability
test it ennunciated only one year earlier in the Cellophane case.
Inexplicably, the majority did not even consider the existence of
substitute uses for the kind of paint and fabric that duPont sold to
General Motors, despite the dissenting Justices' emphasis that du-
Pont's sales to General Motors amounted to only 3.5% of all simi-
lar finishes and 1.6% of similar fabrics.8 Rather, the majority was
satisfied by the peculiar characteristics and uses of automotive
finishes and fabrics.9 Thus, on the basis of criteria it had appar-
ently repudiated one year earlier in constructing a market of broad
dimensions, the Court drew very narrow boundaries around the
sales from one industry to another.
Both the Cellophane and General Motors decisions have been
severely criticized on the basis of the substantive rules or tests set
forth by the Court as well as the casual fashion in which the Court
applied such rules to the facts before it.1" The Court in Cellophane
ignored many factors that suggested that cellophane was unique
and that the cross-elasticity or functional interchangeability be-
tween cellophane and other flexible wrappings was quite low.
Then, in General Motors, the Court focused on the unique features
and uses while ignoring the alternative uses of automotive paints
and fabrics. Certainly, the most troubling aspect of the two cases
was that each apparently employed entirely different legal theories
to define relevant product markets. This was the dilemma facing
the district court in United States v. Brown Shoe Co."
all other finishes and fabrics to make them a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of the
Clayton Act." Id. at 593-94.
8. Id. at 593-96. (Burton and Frankfurter, J.J. dissenting).
9. Id. at 593-94.
10. See SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SULLIVAN]. Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case, 45 AM. EcON. REV. 29 (1955); Turner,
Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 281 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Turner]. Serious questions concerning the efficacy of either test was raised by the Court
itself in Cellophane. The Court noted that the flaw in focusing on peculiar characteristics of
certain products was that such a test could exclude all but physically identical products
from a relevant market. Simultaneously, however, the Court acknowledged that reliance on
the vague standards of interchangeability necessarily results in uncertain applications to
particular facts and circumstances. 351 U.S. at 394-95.
11. 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), affd, Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
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THE BROWN SHOE DECISION: A SYNOPSIS
The District Court Decision
In Brown Shoe, the government attacked a merger between
Brown Shoe Company, Inc. (Brown) and Kinney Company, Inc.
(Kinney) that raised issues of horizontal restraint and vertical
foreclosure."3 The parties offered incompatible definitions of the
relevant product market to the district court. The United States
argued for a broad product market comprising all shoes. Brown
and Kinney urged that the broad market be divided into smaller
markets distinguished by the age and sex of the purchasers and the
price and quality of the shoes.
The district court struggled with the various tests it perceived to
be potentially applicable. 13 Based upon its review of "the maze of
cases" previously decided, the court concluded that the relevant
market "cannot be determined by any process of logic and should
be determined by the processes of observation."1 4 The court de-
cided that it had no recourse but to "go to the facts in the case"
and make its determination guided by the "practices in the indus-
try, the characteristics and uses of the products, their interchange-
ability, price, quality and style."1' 5 The object of this inquiry would
be to determine how the industry and the public perceive shoe
products. The court, then, derived three lines of commerce-men's
shoes, women's shoes, and children's shoes-and determined that
competition was sufficiently threatened in these submarkets to
condemn the merger." It was this matter of market definition the
Supreme Court was called upon to address.
12. Brown, the fourth largest shoe manufacturer and third largest retailer, merged with
Kinney, the eighth largest retailer and seller of two percent of the nation's shoes. In some
metropolitan areas, however, the shares of Kinney and Brown were significantly greater,
resulting in 40% or more of the nation's sales. Id. at 297-303 (figures taken from plaintiff's
exhibits cited in the decision).
13. The district court noted that the reasonable interchangeability test of the Cello-
phane case had been distinguished and limited to the monopolization clause of § 2 of the
Sherman Act in United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), but
that arguments to the contrary could be found in American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The court also found authority in
the Bethlehem Steel case for dividing broad lines of commerce into smaller separate lines of
commerce. 179 F. Supp. at 730.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
[Vol. 12
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The Supreme Court Decision
On appeal by Brown and Kinney, the Supreme Court in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States 7 not only affirmed the decision of the
district court but also essentially adopted the district court's rea-
soning on the market definition issue. Cognizant of the tensions
created by the two tests which had been perceived as alternatives
by lower courts, 8 the Supreme Court directly addressed the rela-
tionship between the "interchangeability" and the "unique charac-
teristics and uses" tests.1e Although paying homage to the theoreti-
cal ambitions of the reasonable interchangeability test, the
Supreme Court seemed to give priority to the approach suggested
in General Motors, qualified by the caveat that each case stand
upon its own particular facts.20
The Court set forth a two-step test for market definition which
begins with the inquiry of reasonable interchangeability among
products and proceeds to an evaluation of various "practical indi-
cia" of market characteristics. Elaborating on reasonable inter-
changeability of use, the seven "practical indicia" listed by the
Brown Shoe Court were: (1) industry or public recognition of the
submarket as a separate economic entity; (2) peculiar characteris-
17. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
18. Not every court, however, shared the confusion of the Missouri district court in
Brown Shoe. By the time the Supreme Court decided Brown Shoe, courts in the Southern
District of New York and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had reconciled the two tests
as noted by the following quote: "The tests enunciated by the authorities are consistent.
Effectively, the test 'reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which (the products)
are produced-price, use and qualities considered,' and the test 'sufficient peculiar character-
istics and uses to constitute the products sufficiently distinct'... are but different verbal-
izations of the same criterion." United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 201 F. Supp.
348, 362 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 321 (1962) quoting from United States
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
19. The Court stated:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product
itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well defined sub-
markets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes. The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining
such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a sepa-
rate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique pro-
duction facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors.
370 U.S. at 325.
20. The factual investigation required by these standards was emphasized in United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), wherein the Court observed that the
legal "guidelines offer no precise formula for judgment and they necessitate, rather than
avoid, careful consideration based upon the entire record." Id. at 449.
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tics and uses of the products; (3) uniqueness of production facili-
ties; (4) existence of distinct customers; (5) existence of distinct
prices; (6) customer sensitivity to price changes; and (7) existence
of specialized vendors.1
ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE LAWS APPLICABLE TO MARKET
DEFINITION
Antitrust Policy
If the volumes of opinion and commentary could be reduced to a
single statement, it would resemble the following: the policy of the
antitrust laws is to promote free market competition as the means
of allocating the production of limited resources among ultimate
consumers. 2 Competition, in this sense, is simply the process
whereby producers are motivated by profits and free to enter any
endeavor to meet the demands of consumers for goods and ser-
vices. The reasons are varied for articulating such a procompetition
policy. For example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,'s the Su-
preme Court identified the desirability of retaining local control
over industry and protecting small business, even in spite of possi-
ble economic cost as a possible explanation for such, a policy.24
Other grounds that have been advanced for a procompetition pol-
icy include the desirability of preventing the aggregation of wealth
into a few hands, the sociological benefits of employment in
smaller businesses, and the concern over undue political influence
that accompanies economic power.'
The feature that makes competition attractive from an economic
perspective is that competitive markets are generally the most effi-
cient allocators of production. Indeed, the overriding concern ad-
dressed by the antitrust law and their procompetition policy has
been the efficient allocation of the economy's resources.2 6 Aside
from the obvious advantage of getting the maximum the economy
can provide, the most powerful argument for using the economic
concept of allocative efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust policy is
that it provides an objective analytical framework from which con-
21. 370 U.S. at 325.
22. See Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
23. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
24. Id. at 316.
25. See Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: What Else Counts?, 125 U. PENN. L. REv. 1191
(1977); Sullivan, Sources of Wisdom For Antitrust, 125 U. PENN. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
26. See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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sistent and defensible rules can be derived.27 More importantly, in
the context of relevant market definition, allocative efficiency is
the only relevant aspect underlying antitrust policy, given that the
sociologically-based policies of absolute firm size, local control, and
political influence are either consistent with or independent of the
conditions of free competition. This article, thus, takes the ap-
proach that the efficient allocation of the economy's resources is
the underlying goal of the antitrust laws.
The role that competition plays in providing an efficient alloca-
tion of society's resources is clear and simple.28 Under basic price
theory, the existence of competition prevents any individual pro-
ducer from raising prices above the costs of production because
customers could simply switch to a competitive producer to avoid
the higher prices. This follows from the condition that in a per-
fectly competitive market, the goods of competitors are theoreti-
cally perfect substitutes for the goods of any individual producer.
Therefore, a minor increase in the price of one product is all that is
required to prompt the customers' desertion. To the extent that
perfect substitutes are not available for a firm's products or ser-
vices, that firm can charge a higher price without losing a signifi-
cant number of customers.
Society incurs a loss when customers who are willing to pay for a
firm's cost of production, but not willing to pay a premium above
that price, must resort to less satisfying alternatives. Thus, if the
antitrust laws do foster competition, they should reduce this loss.
In view of these underlying economic principles of the antitrust
laws, the importance of correctly defining the relevant product
market becomes obvious: once the market is defined, the alterna-
tives to which customers can turn, thereby discouraging costly pre-
miums, have been identified. If those alternatives have been appre-
ciably reduced by a combination of competitors within the market,
that combination may affect the ability of competition to restrict
discretionary pricing.2'
27. See BORK, THE ANrrmusT PARADOX, (1978) [hereinafter cited as BORK]. Professor
Bork argues that the goal of consumer welfare is the only competing antitrust policy which
can be defined without relying upon conflicting value judgments concerning the "preferred"
status of industry. Id. at 50-89.
28. The following discussion summarizes the essential points of basic price theory. More
detailed treatments may be found in Mna.EE, INTERMEDIATE MICRo-EcoNoMics (1978) and
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d Ed. 1966).
29. Whether and how much resource allocation may be impaired by increased concentra-
tion within markets are subjects of continuing debate. See, e.g., GOLDSCHMID, MAN & WES-
19811
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The allocative function of competition, however, may be frus-
trated by mergers and acquisition, monopolizations, and attempted
monopolizations. Because any one of these activities result in vary-
ing degrees of danger to competition, distinct standards of illegal-
ity have been applied to each. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 0 pro-
hibits mergers or acquisitions, the effect of which "in any line of
commerce . ..may be substantially to lessen competition or to
tend to create the monopoly." Section 2 of the Sherman Act s,
proscribes acts, attempts, and combinations "to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States. . . ." The
specific reference in both sections to parts or lines of commerce
establishes the primacy of defining relevant product markets when
interpreting these sections. As a result, exercises in market defini-
tion appear as frequently in section 2 cases as in section 7 cases. It
is appropriate, therefore, to consider whether the distinctions be-
tween the two sections should affect market definition analysis in
cases governed by the statutes.
The Distinctions Between Section 7 and Section 2 Concerning
Market Definition
The key distinction between section 7 of the Clayton Act and
section 2 of the Sherman Act flows from the recognition that an
act which may tend to create a monopoly or which may substan-
tially lessen competition under section 7 may not itself amount to
an act of monopolization under section 2. Congressional desire to
close the loophole of failing to proscribe assets acquisitions inher-
ent in section 7 prior to its amendment in 1950 by the Celler-
Kefauver Act8 led to judicial reiteration of the fundamental poli-
cies behind the Act. The Supreme Court's exegesis in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States of the legislative intent underlying the
amended section 7 of the Clayton Act88 confirms that the major
TON, INDUSTRIAL CoNcReFRATION: THz Nzw LEARNING (1974). The merits of that debate are
beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has
accepted the argument that the vigor of competition is inversely related to the level of con-
centration. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (a merger
significantly increasing concentration of a market is inherently likely to decrease
competition).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
32. Celler-Kefauver Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
33. 370 U.S. at 318 n.32. (citing S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 and H.R. Rep.
No. 1191, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 8). As noted by the Court, the Senate Report stated that the
intention was to "cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they
[Vol. 12328
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difference in the treatment of anticompetitive practices under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts is essentially a difference in degree.
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court indicated that mergers, even
in concentrated industries, were not to be deemed unlawful per se.
Thus, the amendments to section 7 would not prohibit a merger
between two small companies that could compete more effectively
with larger rivals by combining their resources, nor would the
amendments prohibit the acquisition of a failing firm which was no
longer a competitive factor in an industry."' Rather, the Court was
concerned that mergers could pose dangers to the economy similar
to those already addressed by the antitrust laws. After assessing
the entire legislative record, the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress was concerned "with the protection of competition, not
competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent
that such combinations may tend to lessen the competition." 85
It should, therefore, be clear that any of the practices proscribed
by the various statutory provisions of section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act present the same ultimate
threat to smoothly functioning competitive markets. Monopoly
simply represents the most extreme departure from perfect compe-
tition. Any act which lessens competition necessarily tends to en-
courage the creation of a monopoly. The conduct which actually
accomplishes a monopolization of a market manifests the same
tendency, but with a greater degree of certainty.
If the ultimate concern under both section 2 and section 7 is the
protection of competition and the definition of a particular market
is relevant only insofar as such a protection of competition is con-
cerned, the same market definition tests should apply under either
section. The Supreme Court has adopted this position, stating that
market definition analysis in merger cases and monopolization
cases should take into account the same considerations." Most
courts which have considered the question have reached the same
have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding," and the House Re-
port noted that mergers and acquisitions could have a cumulative effect in reducing the
"vigor of competition," which would be difficult to attribute to any single transaction.
34. Id. at 319. When given the opportunity, however, the Court ruled otherwise on this
hypothetical. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), dis-
cussed in SULLIVAN, supra note 10, § 200.
35. Id. at 320 [emphasis in original].
36. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the Court stated: "[w]e see
no reason to differentiate between 'line' of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and
'part' of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act." Id. at 573.
1981]
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This position is sound. If market definition is to be useful as a
predictable and reliable fact-finding tool, the standards by which it
is pursued should not vary from case to case. The probability of
ultimate competitive harm is an element of the action separate and
apart from the entity that may be harmed 8 and, thus, should not
be a factor unnecessarily complicating market analysis. The only
distinctions, if any, that should be recognized between market defi-
nition in section 2 and section 7 cases should be the different facts
that each case is likely to involve. Once it is recognized that the
standards are common to both sections, the predictability of out-
comes under each is enhanced by the larger common body of
precedent.
The important fact difference between all section 2 and section 7
cases, then, is a question of quantity not quality. In a section 7
merger case, the existence of two firmss often will involve a wider
37. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980); Columbia Metal Culvert Co., v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579
F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Twin City Sportservice Inc. v.
Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
The minority view, however, suggests that § 2 market definition analysis should be distin-
guished from § 7 market definition analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.,
440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Pargas v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.
1976), aff'd, 536 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Comment, Relevant Geographic Market
Definition, 1979 DuKH L.J. 1152 [hereinafter cited as Geographic Market]. The argument
most commonly advanced for treating the concept of relevant market according to the law
under which it is raised focuses on the concern under § 7 to arrest competitive deterioration
at the earliest possible moment. It is suggested that, because the question in merger cases is
"less ultimate," i.e., § 7 cases address the mere likelihood of competitive harm, any of sev-
eral alternative definitions may be more suggestive of such proscribed effects. The most
useful market definition in a merger case, then, may be different from the appropriate defi-
nition in a monopolization case. For example, the aluminum industry may be the appropri-
ate market for an aluminum producer charged with monopolization, whereas a market that
includes steel, aluminum copper, and other metals may be appropriate to a merger between
an aluminum producer and a steel producer. See SULIVAN, supra note 10, § 203.
Unless the argument for distinguishing between market definition in § 2 and § 7 cases is
that the burden of proof of the relevant market should be shifted to defendants in all cases,
which none of the proponents has intimated, it is impossible to impute what market defini-
tion rule is being advocated except perhaps to say that the rule should be governed by a
policy that simply favors plaintiffs in merger and monopolization cases. Such a policy, how-
ever, eliminates the possibility of deriving objective and consistent rules to govern market
definition. Neither liberalization nor restriction of market boundaries has a consistent effect.
Narrower markets tend to favor mergers of differentiated goods, whereas broader market
definitions favor monopolists and mergers of producers of very similar products.
38. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
39. Because two firms are voluntarily combining operations in a merger context, the in-
ference can be made that the parties perceive a net benefit from the move. The possibility
exists that the benefit may come in the form of supra-competitive returns resulting from the
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variety of products. Thus, additional product markets must be
identified. 40 The existence of many different markets, with their
own characteristics, may call for the assessment of different facts
but not for a different methodology by which to assess those facts.
Accordingly, in the legal analysis that follows, section 2 cases will
be treated analogously with section 7 cases except where noted to
the contrary.
The Distinctions Between Vertical Mergers and Horizontal
Mergers Under Section 7 and the Potential Effect on Market
Definition
The bulk of cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act
falls within one of two categories: vertical or horizontal combina-
tions. The immediate cause of competitive harm is not the same in
the two types of cases. The analysis of horizontal consolidations is
straightforward because the potential injury to competition is di-
elimination of competition between them. This inference, however, adds nothing to the re-
cord of a merger case in that a court will be alerted to the merger's potential anticompeti-
tive effects by the filing of the complaint. Beyond indicating to the court which market or
markets may be involved, the fact that competition in one or more of them may be harmed
depends upon the influence that each firm may have on competition in a market that also
includes the other firm. If the existence or activities of one firm is found to be entirely
unrelated to any market in which the other firm operates, the fact that the two firms are
merging does not, in retrospect, change that result. Thus, legality cannot be determined
before the relevant markets have been defined. Any contrary interpretation would engender
a per se standard of illegality to evaluate challenged mergers.
The previous example of metal producers discussed in note 17 supra contemplates this
kind of inversion. A steel producer's merger with an aluminum producer does not suggest
that steel and aluminum should be in the same line of commerce unless steel and aluminum
are also relevant to the steel producer's attempt to monopolize the steel market. The com-
petitive influence that the aluminum producer exerts on steel and aluminum producers is a
fact that is antecedent to, and not determined by, the steel maker's decision to merge or
monopolize. This fact should guide a court equally in both § 2 cases and § 7 cases. In this
regard, § 7 should not be construed as a license to mold relevant facts.
40. A steel fabricator that produces two goods, such as tools and auto body parts, with
low production substitutability might compete with different entities with respect to each
product. The firm could attempt to monopolize the steel tool market, in which only other
tool firms would be relevant. In a merger with an aluminum sheet producer, on the other
hand, these same tool firms would not be relevant competitors whereas other aluminum
sheet suppliers would be. The different markets in each case are not dictated by the type of
activity involved, but by the market in which the activity takes place.
Recognition of the potentially greater quantity of markets involved in a merger case may
explain the repetitive language found in § 7 of the Clayton Act of "any line of commerce in
any section of the country," 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), whereas § 2 of the Sherman Act refers
simply to "any part of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). This distinction has been inter-
preted as support for applying different standards under the two sections. See Geographic
Market, supra note 37.
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rect: there is a decrease in the number of competitors. In vertical
cases, however, the immediate impact that results from the trans-
action is not the type of ultimate competitive injury with which
section 7 is concerned. The danger of foreclosure in vertical cases is
first and foremost felt by the sellers or distributors who have been
foreclosed from their customer or supplier. It is possible, and in-
deed presumed, that following a merger between, for example, a
material supplier and a fabricator who uses that material, the
newly integrated firm will terminate outside sources of the mate-
rial it can now provide internally.41 Although this substitution may
be devastating to a displaced supplier, the damage to that supplier
does not become an actionable injury under the antitrust laws un-
less and until it can be shown that competition in any relevant
market will also be harmed. 42
The primary difficulty presented in the market analysis of verti-
cal combinations involves identifying the level at which the rele-
vant market should be drawn. By definition, a merger between a
supplier and a customer in a distribution chain does not expand
any firm's power control over the share of productive resources at
either level of the chain. What may occur is that firms at either
level of the distribution chain may lose sufficient outlets for their
products or sources for their materials.43 These shrinking markets
will result in certain firms exiting from the industry which may,
thus, endanger the competitive structure at the diminished level of
the chain.
Once the appropriate level of production has been identified,
however, the process of defining the relevant market in a vertical
case should be the same as in a horizontal case for reason that the
ultimate issue in either case is the same: whether the reduction of
outlets or sources has posed a threat to competition at the level
that suffers from attrition of the number of firms." Whether or not
the sales of raw materials to industrial users or the sales at retail to
ultimate consumers are at issue, the same considerations apply to
41. See Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
42. See, e.g., Devoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 618 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 86 (1980).
43. But see BORK, supra note 27, at 231-38. Professor Bork argues that if previously
unaligned traders merge, the foreclosure attributable to their exclusive dealing should equal
the outlets and sources released by virtue of their switch. Net foreclosure, therefore, is zero.
44. The direction from which the threat has issued, be it from eliminated suppliers or
customers, is irrelevant to the economic importance and identification of competition at a
threatened stage.
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determine the severity of a threat to competition. The relevant
market inquiry must focus on an identification of those products or
services that exhibit the degree of substitutability necessary to re-
strict the discretion of the surviving providers to raise their prices.
The purpose of defining the market is to determine whether the
range of available substitutes has become so narrow that the de-
parture of yet another producer will substantially impact upon the
number of viable alternatives to which customers may turn. Thus,
although a vertical combination case may require that every mar-
ket, each with its own peculiar characteristics, identified at differ-
ent levels of the chain of distribution be analyzed separately for
competitive harm, the kind of analysis called for should employ
the same methods as in a purely horizontal case.4"
Overview on Market Definition Policy and Analysis
The above conclusions regarding market analysis under the vari-
ous antitrust laws and concomitant social and economic policies
simplify market definition analysis. The discussion of the method-
ology of defining relevant market need not be cluttered with quali-
fications depending upon the statute involved or the characteriza-
tion of the offense. The relevant market, as the Supreme Court has
suggested, is a fact to be discovered at trial."4 The standards gov-
erning the process of finding that fact, therefore, should not
change from statute to statute or case to case.
POST-BROWN SHOE DEVELOPMENTS
An Introductory Overview
Although the two-step analysis set forth by the Supreme Court
45. The Supreme Court has made little comment on the distinction between product
market definition in vertical cases and that in horizontal cases. Although observing in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) that the cross-elasticity of production
facilities would be relevant in a vertical case, the Court held that the product markets rele-
vant to the horizontal aspects of the challenged merger were identical to the markets rele-
vant to the vertical aspects of the merger. Id. at 325 n.42. Without any additional analysis,
the Court stated that the reasons leading to its conclusions on the vertical issues supported
the same conclusions for the horizontal issues. Id. at 336.
By the same reasoning, the method of market definition followed in § 7 vertical merger
cases should be equally applicable to other vertical arrangements cases, such as exclusive
dealing practices dealt with under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), or § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), in which foreclosure of part of the market is at issue.
Accord, United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
46. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
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in Brown Shoe has been followed by some lower federal courts47
and questioned by others," the market definition test propounded
has generally escaped the kind of criticism that assailed the earlier
market definition analyses set forth in the Cellophane and General
Motors cases." Some commentators, however, have criticized the
analytical process that defines a "revelant market", but then ne-
gates its relevance by further dividing it into "relevant sub-
markets."50 Nevertheless, after Brown Shoe, courts have had a
clear mandate to resolve the product market issue. The issue has
become a matter for the trier of fact to decide, based on findings
relating to certain categories of facts.
It is difficult to take issue, on a theoretical level, with the general
rule and standards espoused in Brown Shoe, except possibly to
question the broad discretion that the analytical framework allows
lower courts in determining the product market. Courts now
should, at the least, be cognizant of the parameters within which
the problem of defining a product market is to be resolved. Never-
theless, the Court did not give priority to any of the individual
criteria enumerated or indicate what circumstances should favor
47. In Harnschfeger Corp. v. Paccar Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979), the court
felt bound to first examine evidence of interchangeability between two kinds of earth mov-
ers and to then proceed to analyze the other criteria, which in the final analysis rebutted the
initial finding of interchangeability. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.), the court observed at the outset that interchange-
ability and cross-elasticity may be insufficient bases on which to form market definitions.
Here the court also overruled the indications suggested by these criteria. See also United
States v. American Technical Industries, Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,873 (M.D. Pa.
1974); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
48. The court in Babcock & Wilcox v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249
(N.D. Ohio 1977) concluded that gas turbine systems did not compete with diesel or nuclear
systems because of low interchangeability and zero cross-elasticity. In United States v.
Charles Pfizer & Co. 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. N.Y. 1965), the court, relying on Cellophane,
stated that the facts it had found rendered the Brown Shoe criteria of no significance. The
evidence of interchangeability, examined for both a functional (potential) component and a
reactive (actual) component, combined with positive cross-elasticity of demand provided
sufficient evidence for the court of a relevant market.
These courts are apparently satisfied with a less extensive analysis than that proposed by
the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe. There is obviously a degree of redundancy in pursuing
detailed market study when interchangeability or cross-elasticity unambiguously delegate
two products to separate markets.
49. See note 10 aupra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., AxEEDA & TuRNER, H1 AwrrrusT LAw 419-21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
AREDA & TURNER]. It has been suggested that the mention of "submarkets" in only § 7
cases limited their application to § 7 actions. See BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS 102 (3d ed.
1964). It should be noted, however, that these problems were primarily academic and raised
in the context of individual cases.
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any criterion. Presumably, an affirmative finding as to any one cri-
terion could control a case, although that finding may be contra-
dicted by several other criteria. In the next case, however, the out-
come could be different.
On a practical level, therefore, significant problems exist with re-
spect to the market definition analysis set forth by the Court in
Brown Shoe. Although, under the analysis, courts have, to some
extent, been relieved of the agony over how to approach the prob-
lem of defining a relevant product market, the uncertainty implicit
in the problem has been one step removed. Litigants are now the
ones who must contend with the lack of predictability that the
Brown Shoe standards have left to this area of antitrust law. As an
issue of fact, ad hoc market definition can pose substantial risks
for a firm assessing the prospects of a successful business transac-
tion. Because facts vary from case to case, there seems scant com-
fort in precedent, regardless of how many cases may interpret the
Brown Shoe guidelines. It is difficult, therefore, to isolate the im-
pact of the individual standards because courts will, in most cases,
rely on as many criteria as can be found.
It would be unrealistic to hope to eliminate the complexity from
the task of defining the relevant market. As the Supreme Court
demonstrated in its failure to find acceptable simple solutions in
Cellophane and General Motors, the nature of the phenomenon to
be defined is itself inherently complex. Nevertheless, recognition of
the complicated dimensions of the subject does not excuse an ad
hoc approach and should not obscure the opportunity to rational-
ize the process. Although the decision in Brown Shoe finally al-
lowed that a variety of evidence could be probative on the issue of
the relevant product market, the Court did not alter the basic
purpose of the inquiry: a determination of the area of effective
competition. "Competition," an economic concept, is itself a term
of art in the antitrust lexicon. A reexamination of the economic
understanding of competition and its role in antitrust law could,
therefore, shed some light on the facts of relevant markets and the
evidence that reveals them.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe itself antici-
pates that the complexity of economic evidence may sometimes be
an incurable problem in antitrust litigation. Even in the ideal case,
with a wealth of sales, price, and cost data, questions will often
remain as to the accuracy of the data and the ability of judges, who
1981]
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understandably resist tackling complex economic theories,51 to
properly analyze the figures. The direct application of economic
theory in measuring the relevant market has, therefore, assumed a
supporting role to that of descriptive characteristics with which
courts and litigants are more familiar with.
The Brown Shoe Criteria
Because limited evidence can prevent cross-elasticity and func-
tional interchangeability from fully describing a market, the Su-
preme Court enumerated the seven factual criteria it deemed rele-
vant to resolving the ultimate issue involved in determining the
relevant product market. The additional detail should not, how-
ever, obscure the ultimate purpose of the inquiry. Regardless of
the evidence presented, the issue remains whether there is suffi-
cient competition between firms to justify including the various
products or services in the same relevant market.
Since Brown Shoe, the seven individual criteria listed by the
Court have been subject to scant systematic analysis or compari-
son.5 2 The absence of such analysis, however, invites trial courts to
continue to engage in automatic accumulation of criteria without
balancing relevance, a practice criticized by several courts of ap-
peals. In the following sections, each criterion is analyzed in terms
of its general relevance and the particular circumstances in which
it is most probative of the issue of the existence of competition.
Additionally, the case law is examined for the consistencies sug-
gested by the analysis. The ultimate purpose of the following in-
quiry is to explore whether interchangeability or any of the factual
criteria enumerated in Brown Shoe has a more specific and consis-
tent function than as a mere tally in a balance sheet.
Reasonable Interchangeability
The validity of the theory of interchangeability espoused by the
Supreme Court in the Cellophane case cannot be faulted, at least
as a beginning to market definition. The identification of substi-
tutes to which consumers can actually turn is the most direct dem-
onstration of the competition which limits the losses connected
51. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) in which the Court denied
the indirect purchasers the right to recover damages because of the complexity of economic
proof.
52. Stripped of superficial distinctions, the Brown Shoe criteria are, primarily, elabora-
tions of the theory set forth in the Cellophane case. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying
text.
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with discretionary pricing ability. 3 The most concise description of
the effect of substitute products to limit pricing power is the price
elasticity of demand, a dimension-free measure of the responsive-
ness of quantity purchased to changes in price." In Cellophane,
the Supreme Court recognized the utility of such analysis.5 '
The Supreme Court in Cellophane relied on two sources of evi-
dence in support of its market definition. First, it found substan-
tial evidence in the record of functional interchangeability of cello-
phane in the majority of its uses." Second, the Court relied upon
the district court's finding that cross-elasticity between cellophane
and other wraps was high.57 It thus appears that the Court was
attempting to articulate the general "reasonable interchangeabil-
ity" test in terms of theoretical economics.58 Although the Court's
53. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
54. Price elasticity of demand for a good is defined as the rate of percentage change in
price. The mathematical formula is: Ed = % change in Quantity/% change in price = A/
Q/AP/P.
55. In the Cellophane case, the Court referred to a variation of price elasticity-the
cross-elasticity of demand. Cross-elasticity of demand between two products is the ratio of
percentage change in the quantity demanded of one product over time to the percentage
change in price of another product. The mathematical formula is: XEd.y = % change in
quantity of y/% change in price of X = AQy/Qy/APf/P.. Because the effect of raising the
price of a product is to induce customers to increase purchases of competitors' products, the
cross-elasticity of demand between substitute products will be positive. To the extent that
competitors' sales are not affected by price changes of the product in question, the cross-
elasticity between the two products will tend toward zero. Finally, complimentary products,
for which sales generally move in the same direction, will show negative cross-elasticity of
demand.
This measure is not completely reliable for comparisons of several goods with respect to
one product's price change because it varies inversely with the size of the original quantity
of each substitute sold. For example, if a rise in the price of grapefruit caused equal in-
creases in sales of oranges and nectarines, the percentage change in nectarines would appear
larger because fewer are sold. See Stigeman, Cross Elasticity and the Relevant Market, 11
1974:2; ZzrrscHRn'r FUR WIRTSCHAPTS UND SOZIALWlSSENSCHArEN (1974).
56. 351 U.S. 377, 405-10. For such food stuffs as bakery products, candy, snacks, meat,
crackers, produce, and frozen foods, cellophane never amounted to one-half of the total
wrappings used for any product. The only products for which cellophane was the clear fa-
vorite, accounting for 75-80% of the total wrapping used, were cigarettes.
57. Id. at 400.
58. This conclusion is best illustrated through a review of the evidence the Court did not
rely upon. For instance, the district court opinion relied liberally upon testimony of sales
and merchandising personnel for the various flexible wrapping material. This testimony re-
vealed that the producers of the various wraps did indeed perceive others as competitive
forces on their ability to increase market share or raise prices. 118 F. Supp. 41, 198. Without
denying the importance of practical evidence, but apparently hoping to reduce the test for
the relevant market to a few fundamental propositions, the Supreme Court virtually ignored
this kind of testimony. Instead, the Court focused on cross-elasticity of demand and, more
extensively, on the interchangeability in the end use. The Court did, however, recite in a
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foray into theoretical economics has been criticized,5 the theory of
interchangeability is valid and relevant product market analysis
should include an economic analysis along these lines."
Industry or Public Recognition of the Submarket as a Separate
Economic Entity
The standard of public or industry recognition of a submarket
can encompass several economic factors germane to the definition
of the relevant product market. Industry recognition, for example,
may refer to the firm's recognition of competitors. A firm planning
to increase sales of a new or existing product must account for the
reactions of other producers who vie for the targeted consumers'
patronage.61 Industry and public recognition also play analogous
roles as demand factors, distinguished only by their influence at
different levels in the chain of production. In retail markets, the
consuming public determines whether particular products are ade-
footnote some of the district court's findings relating to duPont's consideration of the prices
of other wraps when pricing cellophane. 351 U.S. at 401-10 nn. 29-31.
59. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. Critics of the Cellophane case argue that
functional interchangeability, and the fact that consumers actually substituted one product
for another at various price levels, could as easily have been the result of the price of cello-
phane having been set originally at a monopolistic level. Although it is true that the markets
for competitors' products will demonstrate the interchangeability and substitutability that
the Supreme Court was seeking, a monopolist setting prices to maximize profits will seek the
price level that achieves the same result. Monopoly profits will increase along with increases
in the price of a product until the point at which an appreciable number of consumers will
begin to turn away toward other goods. See SAMUELSON, EcONOMICs 459-83 (8th ed. 1970).
Those goods are substitutes, but only at the higher price of the monopolist's good. At a price
near the monopolist's cost of production, its own product would be the clear preference of
consumers. Therefore, substitutability and elasticity or cross-elasticity of demand cannot be
used alone. Some measure of cost must be added to the equation in order to determine
whether any substitutability detected is simply the result of a monopolistic price in the first
place.
The critics of Cellophane would claim that the substantial rate of return generated by
cellophane suggested that duPont had indeed enjoyed a monopolist's discretion to set prices
well above costs and that price cross-elasticity was actually low. See, e.g. AREEDA & TuRNER,
supra note 50, at 399-400. These charges do not, however, attack the Court's methodology
so much as the Court's view of the facts. The Court examined duPont's profits and simply
did not find them excessive or out of line with the remainder of the flexible wrap producers.
351 U.S. at 404.
60. It appears, however, that the majority of courts using the Brown Shoe analysis have
relegated functional interchangeability to an implicit status in their decisions. Although a
modicum of an interchangeability analysis necessarily emerges from a discussion of the
practical indicia enumerated in Brown Shoe, a court will typically proceed directly to a
consideration of those indicia without pausing for a formal finding on interchangeability.
61. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe noted separately the relevance of cross-
elasticity of supply and reserved another criterion for production facilities. 370 U.S. at 325
n.42.
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quate alternatives to one another. At intermediate levels further
down the production chain, buyer representatives of industry serve
this function. Therefore, a plausible interpretation of this standard
for market definition is simply whether the purchasers of particu-
lar products consider those products to be functional equivalents.
It may be significant that the Supreme Court began its list of
practical indicia in Brown Shoe with this criterion, the application
of which is very similar to the broader theoretical concept of rea-
sonable interchangeability of use. A finding of purchaser recogni-
tion of distinct submarkets is similar to a measuring of purchaser
participation, but without a statistical demonstration of actual
substitution. The recognition standard opens the door to subjective
proof, such as surveys of consumer attitudes, testimony of frequent
purchasers, and tolerances of productive adaptability, all of which
are more susceptible to judicial determination than the formula of
cross-elasticity of demand.' Indeed, this kind of evidence can be
more revealing in cases where consumer habit or inertia conceals
potential competitive forces.
The close relationship between this criterion and the ultimate
issue it is intended to address was emphasized by the Supreme
Court in Brown Shoe. There, the Court called for recognition of
the submarket as a separate economic entity, rather than recogni-
tion of a product as a separate competitive factor. 5 Recognition of
the market as an entity, rather than the product as an entity, leads
the trial court to consider consumers' views of viable alternatives
rather than consumers' perceptions of superficial distinctions
among similar products.
When viewed as a demand component, public or industry recog-
nition of a submarket is an extremely persuasive factor and one
that is seldom overruled by contrary indications from the other in-
dicia. Moreover, a finding that customer recognition supports the
court's definition of the relevant product market is seldom absent
from a case. The frequency with which courts rely on this standard
may be due in part to the relaxed and almost intuitive manner in
which it may be proved. The Brown Shoe case itself provides a
typical example, in which the Court stated simply that "these
62. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
63. 370 U.S. at 325. A focus on recognition of differences between products would have
reached a result similar to that found in Cellophane which the Court wished to avoid. Only
identical products with no recognizable differences would tend to be included in the same
relevant markets. See note 10 supra.
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product lines are recognized by the public . . "6 Courts taking a
more analytical approach, however, have focused on the customers'
decision-making process to determine whether they recognize that
different products in the submarket serve the same purpose. If cus-
tomers are free to choose among alternative products to serve their
purposes, then the alternatives may be grouped in one market.65 If
purpose dictates the choice, then separation may be in order."
Other courts have also relied upon evidence relating to govern-
ment census classifications, 7 trade association membership," and
industry publications" as evidence of customer recognition. An
analysis that includes these types of evidence, however, departs
from a pure demand-side approach to market analysis and ap-
proaches a review of the supply side aspects of industry recogni-
tion. This broader evidentiary analysis may, therefore, be inconsis-
tent with the belief that "it is not the perceptions of
manufacturers but those of consumers which are most salient in
the determination of market boundaries. 7 0  Consequently, al-
though seller recognition can be a relevant factor in defining prod-
uct markets, it should not stand alone.
64. 370 U.S. at 326.
65. In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that
engineers designing public swimming pools were generally free to choose between one of two
alternative filtration systems. Although the systems differed substantially in construction,
each performed the same function and were, therefore, included in the same relevant mar-
ket. On the other hand, where the nature of the job to be performed has dictated the choice
among alternative products and the buyer retains no discretion in choosing between the
products, the products have been separated into different markets.
66. See, e.g., Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F.
Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (topography of landscape dictated dredger); SmithKline Corp. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978) (illness of patient determines choice of drug).
67. See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Col. 1975); United States v.
National Steel Corp., 251 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
68. See American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md. 1976), af'd, 546 F.2d 25 (4th
Cir. 1976).
69. See RSR Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980).
70. Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 30
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). See also Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v.
Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d. 701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied
421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Credit Bureau Reports Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex.
1971).
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The relative value of a finding with regard to manufacturer rec-
ognition can also be enhanced by justification for reliance on that
standard. Corporate memoranda and executive statements contain-
ing market analyses which assess the competition a company faces
have been cited as relevant.71 On the other hand, it has been recog-
nized that individual sellers may classify markets for internal ac-
counting or managerial purposes in a manner entirely unrelated to
product markets. 2
Peculiar Characteristics and Uses of the Products
The identification of peculiar characteristics and uses of a given
group of products73 requires more than merely asking what is dis-
tinct about a particular product. This inquiry requires a determi-
nation as to whether there is something about the product which
renders it adaptable to a purpose which cannot be served by any
other product. The standard is the analytical complement of the
standard of recognition. Whereas recognition of interchangeability
seeks to identify those characteristics and uses that are common
among products, the standard of distinct characteristics or uses
71. The annual report of a friction material manufacturer, explaining the unique superi-
ority of its product over the closest substitute, was relied upon to isolate the product in
Abex Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 420 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 865 (1970). See also Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (speech to trade group); General Foods Corp. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968)
(internal memoranda).
72. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
73. The General Motors case gave birth to this indicia. Detailed economic evidence nec-
essary to measure the relevant product market was not before the Supreme Court in that
case because the district court had not engaged in any formal analysis of the relevant prod-
uct market. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. .Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill.
1954). The district court's conclusion that the plaintiff had not violated the antitrust laws
was based upon a finding that no trade restraint was shown with respect to any product
involved in the dealings between duPont and General Motors. The district court held that
thirty years worth of postacquisition evidence failed to support any of the government's
claims of restraint, obviating any effort to define a market within which to assess the re-
straint. Id. at 335.
When the Supreme Court reversed the central finding of the district court and held that
the evidence did prove that free trade was restrained, it became necessary to determine
whether this restraint would lead to a probable lessening of competition or the creation of a
monopoly in any line of commerce. Lacking the benefit of a record containing the detailed
economic evidence that the proceedings in the Cellophane case had developed, the Court
based its market definition on the peculiar characteristics of the products involved. 353 U.S.
at 593-95. Therefore, because the Supreme Court based its decision on the record and by-
passed the obvious alternative of remanding the case to the district court for further find-
ings of fact, it can be argued that the record was considered sufficient.
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searches for those features that make a particular product
"unique". The economic value of this standard is less apparent
than the public recognition standard.
There is no proven connection between the viability of competi-
tion among alternative products and the possibility that one or
more of those products serves a unique function. Of course, if a
product has nothing in common with any other product in that its
uses and characteristics are entirely unique, then the product will
not have satisfied either the general substitutability test or the
most casual appraisal of public or industry recognition. If a prod-
uct has passed those tests, however, then it is not as clear why a
particular product that otherwise competes with various substi-
tutes should be set apart by virtue of the fact that it alone can
serve, and is occasionally purchased for, a distinct purpose.
If the purposes and characteristics that make a product an ade-
quate substitute for other products are sufficient to hold competi-
tive reigns on the pricing of the distinguishable product, its pecu-
liar characteristic and use should not put it into a relevant
submarket all its own. The circumstance under which competitive
forces do not sufficiently discipline the provider of a unique prod-
uct or service occurs when the provider can engage in price deter-
mination between customers by taking advantage of the peculiar
use or characteristic and the other customers of the product.7 ' If
there is a significant group of purchasers who can be segregated
from the customers common to other producers, the unique pro-
vider can act as a monopolist in its dealings with the distinct
group. This criterion thus looms important when considering prod-
ucts which can be easily differentiated, such as complex custom-
ized and personalized products. Moreover, services, by their per-
sonal nature, provide an excellent opportunity for price
discrimination. Cases involving such products or services are, thus,
cases in which the factor of distinct characteristics and uses should
play a prominent role in defining the relevant product market.75
74. See Turner, supra note 10, at 310-11.
75. Before the peculiar characteristics and uses standard was incorporated into the list
of practical indicia by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe, the theory underlying the current
standard launched a unique line of cases relating to financial institutions that has remained
independent of the Brown Shoe approach. These cases involve the concept of a relevant
"cluster" of products or services. The first case to apply the cluster concept was United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), a § 7 action brought by the government challenging the
merger of the second and third largest banks in Philadelphia. The government urged that
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If decisions favor customer recognition as the most consistently
commercial banks should be viewed as a separate line of commerce under the General Mo-
tors standard. The defendents argued that the interchangeability test of Cellophane should
control so that the various functions performed by the bank would be compared individually
with relevant substitutes.
The Supreme Court perceived no conflict between the two tests urged to be applicable in
accepting the government's position regarding the proposed market. Initially, the Court ex-
pressed its reluctance to explore competition for every possible distinct service a bank pro-
vides. 374 U.S. at 326 n.5. More importantly, the Court found that the "cluster" of services
a commercial bank offers and the fact that almost all the services are dependent on one
another were the reasons the institution existed. Id. at 356-57.
The Court did not explain why the combination was so important to the ultimate user.
Presumably, the services were more valuable to customers in combination because the cost
of seeking separate sources for each exceeded any likely savings. Reliance on the cluster
concept was not, however, actually necessary to define the market because the same relevant
market would have resulted if only one of the services provided, commercial checking, was
considered. The Court could have, thus, based its finding on that market in view of the fact
that all the plaintiff must show in a § 7 action is that competition may be lessened in "any"
line of commerce.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, adopted the concept of product and service clusters.
The Court did note an apparent consumer preference for banks, as indicated by its recogni-
tion of one witness' observation that customers seemed to prefer using the commercial
bank's coordinated facilities, despite higher returns available at savings and loans. Id. at 357
n.34. The primary rationale for its holding, however, was that the legal protection of certain
components called for the grouping of those components into a cluster. Accord, United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
The Supreme Court has held fast to the cluster concept, at least as applied to financial
institutions. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974);
United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970). In other
contexts, however, the cluster concept has been treated more gingerly. Courts are cognizant
of the danger the concept poses in permitting parties to gerrymander products and services
into self-serving markets. For example, in Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus-
iness Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), the court found sufficient competi-
tion existent between components suppliers and full-line producers to include them in one
market. Similarly, in United States v. Tidewater Marine Service, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324
(E.D. La. 1968), the court rejected the defendant's attempt to expand markets into a cluster
of boat chartering services because of "active competition with (partial service suppliers
and) particularly in view of the fact that (customers) generally acquire vessels on a boat by
boat bases ... without regard to any total package service." Id. at 331. Accord, American
Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (cluster must be defined
in the context of a buyer-seller transaction).
Properly viewed as a package containing distinct advantages not possessed by the sum of
its individual component parts, the concept of the cluster of products or services provides a
valuable clue to relevant product markets. Identifying a relevant cluster itself requires com-
petent analysis comparing the costs of the transactions avoided in seeking specialists with
the efficiencies sacrificed in combining functions at one source. Sophisticated services, such
as those offered by banks, which involve more personal contact, are more likely to be found
in clusters. The costs of establishing multiple relationships and transactions will, therefore,
tend to be greater than is the case with transactions involving purchases of fungible materi-
als. It is tempting, however, to identify clusters where they may not exist. One court re-
cently confused the cluster concept with relevant market analysis, defining the market to be
a cluster of goods without establishing whether any firm in the market actually produced
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important criterion,'M dicta in the opinions favor peculiar charac-
teristics and uses as the essential ingredient of market definition.7'
In applying this criterion to the facts, however, courts have typi-
cally exercised caution in justifying the role to be taken in circum-
scribing markets. Identifying peculiar uses of functions has typi-
cally taken precedence over peculiar characteristics.'8 Although
unique characteristics typically give rise to unique functions or
uses, especially for consumer goods in which appearance is a
greater factor, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
heeded the conjunctive requirement by disregarding unique char-
acteristics that are not closely related to function.7' Thus, when
the peculiar characteristics and uses standard is applied in support
of the market definition construed by a court, it is the function
and not the characteristic that the court cites in favor of the
criterion.80
the entire cluster. See United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
76. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Harnishchfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151
(E.D. Wis. 1979); Federal Trade Commission v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.
I. 1978).
78. See, e.g., Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Abex Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 420 F.2d 928
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
79. The Supreme Court followed this approach in United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964), where it was held that glass and metal containers were part of the same
relevant market. The fact that bottles and cans were used for the same purposes was found
to be more probative than were their physical dissimilarities. Similarly, in George R. Whit-
ten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1004 (1975), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that, although there were substan-
tial physical differences between competing pool filter systems, identical use dictated the
inclusion of the products in the same market. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. IMI. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the court also
held that the obvious differences between coal, other fossil fuels, and nuclear energy did not
outweigh the competition found between these fuels for the patronage of public utilities.
80. In Federal Trade Commission v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court noted the relative lack of peculiar uses to which machine-blown
and molded glasses were put. The slightly different characteristics of the two styles were,
therefore, not considered significant.
In those cases emphasizing distinct uses, the distinct uses were predominant, not excep-
tional. In Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp. 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978), although the sensitive electrobalance could be used for the
heavier work, over 80% of its sales were for the delicate purposes only it could serve. In
RSR Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980), the court noted that although primary lead and secondary lead can some-
times be used for the same purpose, each was generally used for distinct purposes. In Gen-
eral Foods Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), ctrt. denied,
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Courts have applied and interpreted the peculiar characteristics
and uses standard rationally. In holding that the existence of a
unique feature or function in a particular product will not alone
create a market, courts have properly used the inquiry into distinct
functions and uses more indirectly to determine the extent of com-
mon characteristics and uses. Thus, courts have improved on the
performance of the Supreme Court in General Motors where the
peculiarities were noted casually as sufficient unto themselves in
defining a market.81 Cases in which peculiarities in products have
not loomed important generally confirm the conclusion that the
usefulness of the standard declines in markets resistant to price
discrimination."2
Uniqueness of Production Facilities
Where only a few firms within an industry possess unique pro-
duction facilities, their competitive positions and ability to respond
and control market conditions are strengthened vis-a-vis other
firms. Moreover, possession of unique production facilities, as a
component of cross-elasticity of supply, can be a significant com-
petitive force upon a producer who, from the demand prospective,
appears to be a monopolist.8  Thus, the court should review the
standard of uniqueness of production facilities in defining the rele-
vant product market, although the existence of such facilities is by
no means a prerequisite for finding distinct markets.8 4 Neverthe-
391 U.S. 919 (1968), the court relied upon the finding of the Federal Trade Commission that
a difference between steel wool scouring pads and other scouring materials was more than
cosmetic, in light of the fact that company memoranda revealed admissions by the steel pad
producer that other products were not suitable for the same purpose.
81. 353 U.S. at 593-94.
82. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
the court downplayed the significance of peculiar characteristics and uses. The record in
that case revealed that a large quantity of decorative foil was available to florists who pur-
chased decorative florist foil. Similarly, the fossil fuels in United States v. General Dynamics
Corp. 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Mll. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) were
fungible products, not amendable to price discrimination, and the acidic products for bever-
ages involved in United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)
were homogeneous chemical products, probably easily arbitraged among its consumers.
83. See generally, Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability in Defining the Relevant
Product Market, 65 VA. L. Rzv. 129 (1979).
84. In Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979), for exam-
ple, the peculiar needs of distinct customers were sufficient to outweigh similar production
facilities and the court separated large front end loaders from smaller units. Nor was the
existence of distinct methods of production viewed as a bar in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. IM. 1972), affd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 486
(1974) to grouping metal and glass containers or coal and other fossil fuels into a single
1981]
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less, consideration of this factor may lend guidance to a court and
parties faced with the market definition issue.8s
Existence of Distinct Customers
The existence of distinct customers in a market environment
provides a focus of concern similar to that of the peculiar charac-
teristics and uses standard discussed earlier.86 Instead of seeking to
identify a significant group of customers for whom various prod-
ucts are functionally interchangeable, an attempt is made to iden-
tify distinct customers for whom a particular product is the only
choice. Limited reliance should be placed upon the use of this cri-
terion, however, because an improper application is frought with
the propensity of giving misleading signals.
Whenever a noticeable degree of difference exists between two
products, it is likely that some customers will prefer one to an-
other. Catering to individual preferences is the very purpose of
differentiating products. In stable markets, brand loyalty will per-
petuate consumer buying patterns and tend to associate some cus-
tomers with certain sellers. The indiscriminate, narrow segmenta-
tion of distinct customers and their purchases from a broader
relevant market could, however, purge from that market all but
identical goods.5 7
market for the reason that substitutability in use was deemed sufficient to outweigh the low
cross-elasticity of supply. See also United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729 (D. Md. 1976).
85. It was primarily the existence of unique engineering specialization that led the court
in Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
Wolkswagenwerk, A.G., v. Heatransfer, Corp., 434 U.S. 1087 (1978) to define air condition-
ers made for German automobiles as the narrow relevant product market. Production of the
product in Volkswagenwerk required specialized engineering that only foreign firms pos-
sessed. Similarly, in United States v. Kennicott Copper, Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), a/I'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965), the court found persuasive evidence that only certain firms
were equipped with the facilities and technology to insulate cable with chemically treated
paper. These firms were the envy of the cable industry, which apparently could not easily
convert to such methods. Thus, paper-insulated power cable was found to be the relevant
market.
86. See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text.
87. An analogous result may arise in the context of geographic market definition. For
example, assume that two stores exist within a particular geographic area. 90% of the cus-
tomers in that area shop at both stores but 10% of the customers shop only at the outlet
nearer than rather than at the store which is farther away. It would not make economic
sense to argue that the distinct 10% should place the store into a separate geographic mar-
ket, for the stores compete with one another for the bulk of their business. See generally
Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits,
18 ANTrmusT BuLuni 45 (1973).
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The use of this standard to define a relevant product should,
therefore, be used subject to the following qualifications. First, the
distinct customers should represent a significant economic group.
If the group of customers is too small to merit separate marketing
attention by producers, then there is no need to expend antitrust
resources to protect them. Second, the product or service involved
should be one for which price discrimination is possible. If arbi-
trage cannot be prevented, the distinct group of customers cannot
be forced to pay uniquely higher prices for goods available from
other purchasers of the producer.
As in the identification of peculiar characteristics or uses, the
inquiry into the possible existence of distinct customers would be
rendered unnecessary by a finding that the markets are already
distinct under the criteria of elasticity, substitutability, or industry
or public recognition because such a finding would give prima facie
validity to a proposed market. Thus, the criterion of distinct cus-
tomers should be used to modify and finish the market contours
rather than establish them. The issue of distinct customers should,
therefore, be a secondary issue in determining market definition.
Courts have properly interpreted and applied this criterion and
have recognized it as actually the least reliable basis for narrowing
a product market. Even in cases involving sophisticated, personal-
ized products, courts have generally been reluctant to find that a
group of distinct and identifiable customers should be excluded
from a broader product market."' When the existence of distinct
88. For example, in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F. 2d 894
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 802 (1975), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, as clearly erroneous, the district court's finding that the market for peripheral com-
puter equipment should be limited to products compatible with IBM computers. Although
users of IBM computers were often bound by long-term leases on the central units and
peripheral manufacturers sometimes specialized in equipment compatible with IBM ma-
chines, the ease of adapting the connecting plugs on most brands of computers to accommo-
date most brands of peripheral equipment eliminated justification for isolating IBM users.
Accord, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). But see Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (high compatability conversion costs led
the court to find a narrow market of distinct customers).
An attempt by a producer of vending machines to define a submarket according to sales
to Coca-Cola bottlers was similarly rejected in Seeburg Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
425 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970). The producer, whose ma-
chines were not approved by Coca-Cola, acquired another producer whose machines had
gained approval. The fact that Coca-Cola had approved the acquired firm's machines was
the only factor distinguishing those machines from the acquiring firm's machines, and the
court held that that fact was insufficient to narrow the definition of the relevant product
market.
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customers is found to support a narrowly defined market, it has
typically followed similarly consistent findings regarding customer
recognition or distinct uses. Moreover, the distinct customers iden-
tified in narrow markets have properly included the majority of the
purchasers in those markets.89 Finally, the absence of distinct cus-
tomers, which may follow from a finding of common uses of func-
tions, has been cited by courts to reject attempts to narrow the
market.'0
Existence of Distinct Prices
It would seem at first blush that the fact that products are trad-
ing at distinct prices indicates that the products do not compete
with one another, for such price discrepancies are precisely what
effective competition within a relevant market is expected to elimi-
nate. If a perfect substitute exists for a high-priced product and
that substitute is available at a substantial discount, the movement
The distinct customer criterion served no better in Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 575 F. 2d 256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1978), a monopolization
case in which the plaintiff, having formed a firm consisting of former employees of a scien-
tific instrument manufacturer for the primary purpose of servicing its products, was frus-
trated by the manufacturer's tactics. The defendants' alleged business torts fell short of
attempted monopolization, however, because the court refused to restrict the market to
purchases of the manufacturer's products. When competitors' products were included, mar-
ket shares fell below threshold levels of probable success. See also International Telephone
& Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975)
(government or captive purchasers are not necessarily distinct customers meeting sub-
market treatment); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,271
(M.D. Tenn. 175) (affiliated purchasers not included in the defined product market).
89. See, e.g., Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729 (D. Md. 1976); Reynolds Metals v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
A recent exception is the case of U.S. v. Household Finance Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980), in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's decision that banks and finance companies occupied the same
market. The sole ground for reversal was the possibility, not found at trial, that at least 15
percent of finance company customers could not qualify for bank credit. 602 F.2d at 1255.
Significantly, the Brown Shoe criteria were ignored. Rather, the Seventh Circuit, not relying
on the threat of price discrimination, simply held that a significant number of district cus-
tomers was sufficient.
90. In Science Products Co. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. IM. 1974),
the plaintiff's claim that dry chemicals and liquid chemicals, or alternatively lawn chemicals
and garden chemicals, constituted separate submarkets was rejected by the court, in part,
because the same customers used the products for both purposes. See also Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F.
Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Federal Trade Commission v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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of consumers to the lower-priced good should tend to equalize the
two prices. The viability of this indicator is mitigated, however, by
the possibility that subtle quality or quantity differences may be
the true source of the distinct prices. The problem, therefore, in-
volves a determination of the unit of good or service against which
the price is to be applied.
The use of distinct prices as a criterion for determining the rele-
vant market is complicated by the tendency that the criterion is
most often an issue when very similar goods are being compared
and the most noticeable distinction between the goods is price. For
example, a pair of shoes selling at twice the price of another pair
may actually be an adequate substitute for two pairs of lower-
priced shoes, a fact which may significantly limit the discretionary
power of producers. The usefulness of price distinctions is further
limited by the likelihood that a continuous scale of prices and
qualities will characterize most product or service lines. Therefore,
the existence of distinct prices provides little insight into the pe-
rimeters of product markets. One would, thus, expect it to carry
little weight compared to the other Brown Shoe criteria.
The experience of the defendants in Brown Shoe presaged the
skeptical treatment courts have accorded claims that the existence
of distinct prices should govern market boundaries. Brown Shoe
and Kinney had urged that the market for shoes be divided into a
submarket of high-priced fashions and one of cheaper economy
shoes. The Court acknowledged the existence of the wide range of
prices for shoes but refused to segment the market on the basis of
price because it was unable to find a significant gap between the
suggested submarkets distinguished primarily by price and quali-
ty."' Other courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead.12 If,
91. 370 U.S. at 326.
92. In Beatrice Foods Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976),
Beatrice Foods attempted to defend its acquisition of a quality paintbrush manufacturer in
arguing for an alternative market definition separating do-it-yourself paintbrushes from the
more expensive professional brands. The court could not, however, find a meaningful break
in price-scale to justify any such division. See also Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1980) (relevant market includes private label and
brand name frozen waffles); Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 567 F.2d
1273 (4th Cir. 1977) (relevant market includes both premium and economy dog foods);
Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973) (inter-
changeability of aluminum alloys of use outweighs higher price of a specific alloy); United
States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 385
U.S. 37, reh. denied, 385 U.S. 1021 (1966) (relevant market includes both private label and
premium beers).
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however, a significant gap can be found to exist between inexpen-
sive and expensive products serving similar functions, the distinct
prices criterion has been recognized to narrow the relevant product
market.9 Where a court has already found a valid market division
by virtue of the existence of more fundamental criteria, a bona fide
advancement of the distinct prices criterion has a better chance of
affecting the market definition issue."
Customer Sensitivity to Price Changes
Sensitivity to price changes is nothing more than an informal
statement of the principles encompassed by elasticity and cross-
93. In United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976), the
court defined the relevant product market as light chainsaws for occasional use and selling
at another $200. The court noted that virtually all retail sales to consumers were made in
the price range of $170-$180 or less. Professional chainsaws, which were generally heavier
and designed for continuous use, sold for prices in excess of $200.
The distinct prices criterion was also considered a significant factor in United States v.
American Technical Industries, Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974)
where the court held that artificial Christmas trees were not in the same market as natural
Christmas trees, despite the fact that they were generally interchangeable and purchased by
the same customers. In reaching its conclusion, the court also relied upon findings of weak
industry recognition of competition and price insensitivity. Accord, Photovest Corp. v. Foto-
mat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (drive thru kiosks
more costly and insensitive to other prices); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (finding distinct prices for larger front end loaders but mini-
mizing their importance); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
(higher prices, distinct vendors, and buyer recognition of Pennsylvania grade oil).
94. In Science Products Co. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. III. 1974),
the court found a broad product market, in part, because it could not discern any distinc-
tion between the prices of the products the plaintiffs wished to separate. See also Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 518 F.2d
913 (9th Cir. 1975) (telephone equipment); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (alternative
filtration systems); United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (fresh and frozen institutional pies); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F.
Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (fresh and frozen pies). Similarly, in cases where customer recog-
nition and uniqueness of function suggest market division, the existence of distinct prices
has buttressed the market definition result. See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron
Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Seeburg Corp. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 425 F.2d 124 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970); Reyn-
olds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
As the functional similarity between products diminishes, however, the usefulness of the
distinct prices criterion is undermined by the difficulty of measuring the appropriate units
of products. This was a problem the court faced in General Foods Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 386 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). In that case,
General Foods had claimed that price distinctions between other products and steel wool
pads were illusory because the longer life of other products compensated for the price differ-
ence. The court took the opposite view in concluding that such a contrived argument only
served to demonstrate the distinct prices. Id. at 942.
Relevant Product Market
elasticity of demand. As is the case with the criterion of public
recognition, the general terms of this criterion represent the Su-
preme Court's compromise between theoretical fidelity and practi-
cal necessity. Despite the reference in many cases to elasticity or
cross-elasticity, it is extremely rare that the actual formulas have
been used at trial. Even the Cellophane case, which gave wide cur-
rency to the concept, involved nothing more than an observation of
price sensitivity demonstrated by a review of quantities of prod-
ucts purchased at various prices."
The calculation of elasticity of demand has been considered by
courts to be one of the most difficult statistical exercises of applied
econometrics.96 In the common situation, data are not available in
sufficient quantity and regularity to permit statistically valid com-
putations of elasticity. Indeed, the trial court is fortunate when it
has any information from which the mildest implication of sensi-
tivity can be drawn. Thus, although the criterion of consumer sen-
sitivity to price changes shares with the economic concept of elas-
ticity the advantage of reaching the essence of competition within
a market, it also shares, albeit to a lesser extent, the disadvantage
of limited availability and difficult measurement.
Although there remains occasional judicial reference to cross-
elasticity of demand, and even a rare attempt to measure it,", the
theoretical exercise of the Cellophane case has largely been incor-
porated into the more practical standard of market sensitivity to
prices. This criterion often combines with seller recognition to pro-
vide a standard that has been found persuasive by many courts in
defining narrow markets." By the same token, courts finding
broader markets have viewed sensitive prices as highly persuasive
95. 351 U.S. at 402-04.
96. For example in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Supreme Court
based its general prohibition on indirect purchaser suits largely upon the difficulty of deriv-
ing a reliable measure of elasticity of demand.
97. After reviewing a detailed statistical demonstration of elasticity of demand for pies,
a frustrated court in United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
declared the result meaningless because there was no standard against which to compare the
value.
98. For example, in General Foods Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 386 F.2d 936 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968), the court found persuasive internal corporate
memoranda admitting that prices of possible competitive products could be ignored in mar-
keting strategy. In SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
af'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978), similar admissions,
plus a generally available price survey, greatly undermined the defendant's argument that
its trademark antibiotic competed with a broad spectrum of other antibiotics. The court
found that the price of the drug rarely changed during massive shifts of consumer demand.
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in grouping different products into one relevant market.9"
Existence of Specialized Vendors
It is not immediately apparent what the consideration of special-
ized vendors adds to the overall framework of market definition
analysis given that the criteria relating to distinct customers and
unique production facilities tend to overlap into this criterion. Per-
haps the most plausible distinction justifying the criterion is that
vendors differ from customers in that vendors act primarily as dis-
tributors of a finished product whereby customers may purchase
for ultimate use or further fabrication. If, however, the term "ven-
dors" is confined to cover those business entities engaged in whole-
saling and distribution activities, the process of identifying them
provides little insight into the ultimate question of the product
market as a relevant level of commerce. On the other hand, when a
significant group of distinct vendors handles a product whose rele-
vant market is in question, their identification can provide useful
information which may reveal otherwise unnoticed barriers to com-
petition or pockets of monopoly. As such, the criterion may prove a
valuable perspective, rather than a different method, in approach-
ing market analysis.
A disadvantage accruing to a recognition of the existence of dis-
tinct vendors as a separate index of market definition is that it can
be cited as direct evidence of distinct markets and applied in igno-
rance of its important indirect implication. The most obvious haz-
ard raised is the possibility of perceiving danger in the wrong in-
dustry.100 In any horizontal merger, the market in which
competition may be threatened and which therefore must be de-
fined is the market threatened by a depleting number of firms, not
the market containing the distinct vendors of those firms' prod-
ucts. There is no special cause for concern for the vendors of such
products that does not apply with greater force to the ultimate
consumers. Competition among vendors is not ordinarily
threatened by monopoly pricing upstream in production. It is gen-
99. See Federal Trade Commission v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Science Products Co. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill.
1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. IM. 1974), af'd on
other grounds, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
100. For example, in Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1980), the court was unpersuaded by the fact that different wholesalers handled the
brands of waffles that the plaintiff had tried to separate into two markets, given that the
products competed directly at the consumer level.
[Vol. 12
Relevant Product Market
erally in the best interests of firms in the production chain to deal
with efficiently operating competitive markets at other levels of
production.
The importance of the specialized vendors criterion is best re-
vealed by the fact that it is the standard least cited by courts for
resolving a relevant product market issue. It is a factor that one
court has dismissed as less relevant than the other criteria.'0 1 In a
number of cases, the standard is employed primarily as an after-
thought, with little explanation for its use.10 2 The majority of
courts that have used the criterion in the sense suggested by the
economics of relevant markets, however, have examined the nature
of the vendors to determine whether there is a commonality of ul-
timate customers and uses for products.103
CONCLUSION
The substantial representation of circuit court opinions on the
relevant product market issue should serve as a warning. Despite
the universal acknowledgment that defining the market is a ques-
tion of fact, the issue is often retried on appeal. The pretext of the
reviewing courts has, then, been to correct erroneous applications
of law to fact1 " and clearly erroneous decisions.10 5 The result, how-
ever, has provided few clear statements of law. The consistent mes-
sage to emerge from the circuit courts is that the definition of the
relevant market requires meticulous justification.
The theory articulated by the Supreme Court in the Cellophane
case, as embodied in the methodology of the practical indicia set
forth in Brown Shoe, has been accepted. The support for the the-
ory and analytical framework provided comes not from the holding
101. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975); United States v. American
Technical Industries, Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
103. Thus, in Science Products Co. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill.
1974), the absence of specialized vendors led the court to a finding of identical consumers
and a broad product market. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Lancaster Colony
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Similarly, in United States v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976), the fact that different departments and different
retailers handled lightweight chainsaws suggested that those items were distinct from the
heavier professional models. Accord, United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 60,271 (N.D. Tenn. 1975).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Household Finance Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
105. See, e.g., Sargent Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
1981]
Loyola University Law Journal
of any one case, for the infinite variety of factual circumstances
precludes such precedent, but from the gradual accumulation of
applications of the various Brown Shoecriteria. Courts have recog-
nized that market definition analysis involves an objective eco-
nomic task and, thus, have declined the opportunities to define so-
cial policy in drawing the boundaries around markets. The
consensus of the opinions reveals the influence of economics in the
treatment of the Brown Shoe guidelines. The indicia most closely
related to the ultimate issue of competition-market recognition
and unique functions-are the ones most often used and least
often disputed. The criteria bearing less directly on competi-
tion-distinct customers and specialized vendors-are invoked less
frequently and justified more carefully.
Thus, the Brown Shoe indicia do not represent talismans or bal-
lots to be counted mechanically in reaching a conclusion as to the
relevant market. A simple majority count of certain of the indicia
does not necessarily determine the proper product in a given case.
The strongest criteria in any case have been the ones that have
been applied and explained. The strongest cases have been the
ones in which each criterion has been considered and assessed for
its explanatory power of competition in the markets involved.
There is no requirement that every indicia be analyzed and proved
in every case. The fact that courts of appeals are anxious to stake
their own market boundaries, however, is reason enough to evalu-
ate all appropriate criteria enumerated by Brown Shoe whenever a
definition of the relevant product market is an issue in a case.'"
106. See the following Appendix for an examination, in table form, of cases employing
the analysis set forth in Brown Shoe and the particular criteria used in each case.
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APPENDIX
Selected Cases Applying Brown Shoe
The following table lists selected cases which have applied the
analysis established in Brown Shoe and the particular criteria used
in each case.
The column headed Narrow/Wide is included to show which of
the proposed markets the court accepted and which party pre-
vailed on that issue.
For each, case, the criteria columns are marked with a positive
sign, "+ ", or a negative sign, "-", to indicate whether evidence
relating to the criteria supported or contradicted the court's overall
finding. Thus, either sign could mean either a broad or narrow
market depending on the court's finding.
Entries enclosed in parentheses indicte that the party pressed an
alternative argument or that the evidence cited was considered
barely relevant.
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